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12 Women, Disabled 
JANA BENNETT 
The dissonance raised by the nonacceptance of persons with disabili-
ties and the acceptance of grace through Christ's broken body necessi-
tates that the church find new ways of interpreting disability. 
Nancy Eiesland, The Disabled God 
Women are disabled. This is not simply the notion that some women have 
disabilities (in the way that I myself am a woman with a hearing loss), but that 
the very fact of being a woman is a disability. I have no doubt that there are 
people who might find this statement offensive. People with disabilities (as 
commonly understood) might find it so because it would seem to lessen diffi-
culties, pains, and real encumbrances that disability entails. Some feminists 
might do so because it would seem to emphasize some of the very stereotypes 
of women that they wish to overcome: that women are weak and irrational. 
Yet I do not make this statement to be provocative so much as to high-
light that women's problems have been curiously similar to those experi-
enced by people with disabilities. By many feminist accounts, Nancy 
Eiesland's quote above could easily apply to women, substituting "women" 
for "persons with disabilities:' The woman-disability connection exists in 
part because feminists often write about the ways in which women wrestle 
with bodies that are limiting and frustrating, and the ways in which Chris-
tians have contributed to poor theology and oppressive practices about 
those bodies. As Doreen Freeman writes, "Looking through the Hebrew and 
Christian scriptures and writings of the tradition, it is hard to tell women 
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apart from disabled people" (Freeman 2002,74). Writers over the centuries 
have noted that women bleed, are missing (apparently) some key anatomy, 
and are not rational - just as those with disabilities have wounds that don't 
heal, may be missing some parts of their anatomy, and may not present 
themselves as rational. Feminist and disability theologians alike critique 
thought that suggests "normal" is a young, physically muscular, perfectly 
formed adult male body, which by default is rational. Bodies are especially 
difficult and frustrating for those who are patronized or persecuted because 
of them, so in this sense, perhaps women and people with disabilities have 
similar concerns and points to share with each other. Although thoughts 
about disability and women may well be intertwined, disability theologians 
and feminist theologians rarely reference each other except in passing. 
Of course, I have a caveat to all this. Saying that women are disabled 
does not thereby mean that women intuitively have a greater understanding 
of what it means to live in a wheelchair or any host of other ways in which 
bodies can be disabling. That women (and men) have reflected on bodily 
frustrations about gender in ways that intersect with work done by disability 
theologians does not yield a universal account of disability. And yet, I think 
that feminists and disability theologians can learn something from each 
other. My aim in this chapter, therefore, is to tell a story about feminist theol-
ogy in terms of thinking about disability. My telling of the story highlights 
the Similarity of questions and observations made for both and also indi-
cates some of the ways in which feminism and disability theology have not 
been good for each other. Ultimately, I make the case that naming women as 
disabled, even with all the caveats, opens a space for a better theological an-
thropology - a better understanding of who we are as God's creatures. 
The three excerpts I have chosen help me tell this story (though not 
exhaustively). The first excerpt is written by Rosemary Radford Ruether, a 
Catholic theologian currently working at Graduate Theological Union, who 
offers a survey of several kinds of feminism and proposes her own liberatory 
model of feminism. The second excerpt is by Nancy Eiesland, a disability 
theologian most known for her book The Disabled God. Eiesland taught at 
Candler School of Theology and was interested in how feminist theology in-
tersected with liberation models of disability. The third excerpt is from Sa-
rah Coakley, who teaches at Harvard Divinity School. Unlike Ruether and 
Eiesland, Coakley has taken questions about bodies in postmodern direc-
tions, following the work of feminist theorists like Judith Butler. 
I offer an additional note about "feminism" here. The word usually re-
fers to twentieth-century and twenty-first-century academics, activists, and 
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others concerned for women's political and economic rights (such as the 
right to get a divorce on the same terms as men can), as well as the ways in 
"Which history and culture have often made women out to be lesser beings. 
The word therefore involves several diverse collections of ideas and people, 
so that contemporary scholars speak of "feminisms" in the plural. 
If there is a common issue that unites these diverse feminisms together, 
I think it may well be concern for bodies. Different feminist perspectives will 
variously approach what "the body" means, but all have confronted the ines-
capable fact that humans exasperatingly inhabit bodies that mark and limit 
them. Feminist theologies therefore provide an excellent opportunity for 
thinking through various approaches toward disabled bodies. 
The Body to Be Surpassed 
This history begins with many people's realization that Jewish and Christian 
traditions have long considered both women and those with disabilities to be 
troublesome. At least as far back as the Grimke sisters (nineteenth century), 
women have wondered what it is about their bodies that prohibits them from 
working outside the home, from seeking ordination, and from having equal 
legal rights (and even authority) over men. Creation, in Genesis, looms large: 
:Eve is taken from Adam's side and is therefore inferior to Adam, because he 
was made directly by God. Even from her very birth, then (at least according 
to the second creation account), Eve has a body that is inferior to Adam's, just 
as those with disabilities are seen as having inferior bodies. Moreover, being a 
woman is linked to sin, just as disability has often been linked to sin. Eve is 
the first one to eat the fruit from the forbidden tree, and thus she and all 
women bear the blame for sin being brought into the world, just as in ancient 
Hebrew tradition, disability was seen as evidence of sin. 
In 12.1, Rosemary Radford Ruether traces the development of these 
scriptural ideas through the broader Christian tradition. She notes, for ex-
ample, Augustine's sense of woman's "bodily representation of inferior, sin-
prone self [so] that he regards her as possessing the image of God only sec-
ondarily" (Ruether 1993, 95). Thomas Aquinas strengthens Augustine's view 
in her account, because he accepts a view of women as inferior because they 
are reversed versions of men (Summa Theologica 1.92). Women's genitalia 
are inward, receptive cavities - the reverse of men's. Men's genitalia are out-
ward, more clearly present, and add to the sense that men are less passive. 
The Reformers did nothing to change bodily representations of women; in 
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fact, they even more strongly counted the Fall as the reason for the loss of 
women's equality with men. Women's subjugation is punishment for crimes 
committed at creation. 
And so, according to tradition, these troublesome bodies cannot be or-
dained. Leviticus 21:16-23 says: 
The LORD spoke to Moses, saying: "Speak to Aaron and say: No one of 
your offspring throughout their generations who has a blemish may ap-
proach to offer the food of his God. For no one who has a blemish shall 
draw near, one who is blind or lame, or one who has a mutilated face or a 
limb too long, or one who has a broken foot or a broken hand, or a hunch-
back, or a dwarf, or a man with a blemish in his eyes or an itching disease 
or scabs or crushed testicles:' 
According to this passage and others in Leviticus and Numbers, women may 
not be priests, but neither may those who are disabled. (For further discus-
sion, see Christopher Newell 2007, 328.) Feminist theologians and disability 
theologians alike have taken on the task of reading scripture with their own 
respective eyes. Consider Phyllis Trible's Texts of Terror, which examines sto-
ries in Hebrew scriptures for what they have to say about women, though 
their focus is often on men. 
Added to all this is a question about salvation. The importance of Jesus 
is that he is the God-man, taking on human flesh, becoming one with us, 
and therefore offering both the possibility of salvation from sin and unifica-
tion and restored friendship with God. But this point of theology has led 
some to ask how it is that a male savior can save women. The second part of 
the excerpt from Ruether addresses this question. Jesus took on only male 
flesh, so is there not a way in which he is saving only men? In terms of dis-
ability, people do not generally speak of Jesus as disabled, so likewise, how is 
it that Jesus identifies enough with deafness to offer salvation to those with 
hearing loss? If Jesus is envisioned as somewhat disabled, it is on the cross, 
and his suffering is seen as virtuous - a problem for some feminists and dis-
ability theologians. Why glorify suffering, particularly when women and the 
disabled suffer at the hands of a patriarchal, able-bodied society? 
The self-doubt raised by these questions and assumptions leads in part 
to a desire to get beyond these troublesome bodies. The predominant medi-
cal model of disability supposes that we might be able to surpass disability, 
in a sense, by healing it. Gene therapy, cochlear implants, and other medical 
interventions are designed to give the appearance, if not the reality, of a 
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whole, non-disabled body. At heart, the medical model presupposes that the 
problem is the person with the disability, that the disabled person wants to 
overcome that disability, and that medicine and/or scientific advancements 
provide a way to surpass otherwise disabled bodies. 
Likewise, the medical model of disability applies to women. Several au-
thors have noted the ways in which childbirth and periods have become part 
of the realm of doctors, to be properly attended to by scientifically trained 
people who see pregnancy, labor, and periods as illnesses. Jennifer Block dis-
cusses the episiotomy, for example. There was a common belief in the mid-
twentieth century that episiotomies were necessary because babies were too 
big to pass through the vagina. People failed to note, however, that the birth 
canal only seemed too small when women were lying on their backs in bed, 
which was and is the normal birth position in most hospitals. But for centu-
ries, women had been giving birth in a variety of other positions, including 
squatting and standing. Those positions allow the pelvis to widen to the 
greatest degree possible, enabling women to give birth much more easily 
than when lying down. Yet under new hospital protocol, women were given 
episiotomies surgically, which actually increased the time they needed for 
recovery and which could lead to infections and problems with bladder and 
bowel control. By the early 1980s, the Center for Disease Control in the 
United States did a study that determined conclusively that there was no sci-
entific basis for episiotomies, and yet that had been the medical standard for 
decades because doctors saw women's bodies as inadequate (Block 2007, 28-
30 ). Another example might be the Seasonale birth control pill, touted as a 
way for a woman to have a period only four times a year, to "fix" the problem 
that is menstruation. Via pharmaceuticals, women can limit their own limits 
and presumably surpass much that is wrong with being in female bodies. 
Why not embrace these visions to surpass bodies? A medical model that 
allows a person to surpass a body in such a way that one could "pass" as not-
disabled or not-woman is a ticket to greater freedoms, greater enjoyment of 
life, and salvation in this life. Why would feminists object to anything that 
would permit women to have better lives, free of regular periods and painful 
childbirth? Why should theologians of disability object to a medical model 
of disability that might, in fact, allow for ordination of those who do not 
have hands or perfect limbs? 
Indeed, some forms of feminism undergird this desire to get beyond 
bodies. In excerpts 12.2 and 12.3, Ruether discusses some of these "egalitar-
ian Christologies" that wish to transcend bodiliness. For example, she dis-
cusses what she names "eschatological feminism" (excerpt 12.2), exemplified 
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by some early Gnostic groups which developed the idea that being Christian 
required surpassing bodies in favor of spiritual lives focused on the world to 
come, which, as these Gnostics saw it, would be egalitarian. Ruether cri-
tiques this stance, however. While she is sympathetic to an egalitarian view, 
she is concerned by the exclusive focus on the future and not the here and 
now. Thus, Ruether does not share the optimism of Elaine Pagels, another 
prominent feminist scholar who sees Gnostic texts as liberating for women. 
Liberal feminism (excerpt 12.3) represents another egalitarian Christol-
ogy stemming from the secular version of liberalism. Mary McClintock 
Fulkerson describes the main ideas of liberalism: "the primacy of individu-
als, the value of individual autonomy and choice, a state limited to the func-
tion of protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals, and a neutral pos-
ture toward any account of the good in order to protect a plurality of views" 
(Fulkerson 1994, 5). Under liberalism's influence, some concluded that men 
and women could be equal because both were autonomous individuals and 
had rationality and moral reasoning in common. 
The benefit of liberalism is that it envisions equality as a historical pos-
sibility, so, unlike Gnostic views, it allows for and even foments revolution 
with the aim of equality. But who provides the basis for that equality? Equal-
ity has often meant urging women to take on male roles, which then further 
suppresses women. Ruether makes her critique of liberalism along this line, 
and that critique stands against the medical model of disability as well. It 
presumes a liberal view of bodies in its attempt to help all be "equal:' which 
means that we are all autonomous, rational creatures. Yet Ruether claims 
that this focus is exclusive even as it seeks to universalize all humans, be-
cause the focus on rationality and autonomy means that other valid (perhaps 
better) accounts of humans are left out. 
Thus far, I have suggested that for feminist theologians, women and 
people who are disabled stand together against prevalent presumptions 
about bodies. The initial issues that the Christian tradition raised and the ar-
guments made against those issues are such that it is almost impossible to 
distinguish between the issues of women's bodies and disabled bodies. 
The One Human Body 
One solution to attempting to surpass bodies is to embrace them. Lisa 
Isherwood, a postmodern theologian particularly concerned with body the-
ology, writes, "I think we have to take incarnation much more seriously, to 
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take the flesh as the place where the utopian vision of heaven is felt and lived 
- we have to en flesh the Christ that we are baptized into and profess to be-
lieve in" (Isherwood 2007). Far from being an object to surpass, the body is 
something to celebrate, according to many feminists and disability theolo-
gians. A focus on Paul's vision that Christians are one body in Christ and 
that there are many members in the one body allows for different bodies to 
be appreciated as gifts. Paul's words here provide a popular early feminist 
scripture that supports many ways of being, both male and female. 
Alongside this celebratory view of bodies comes the "social model" (as 
opposed to the medical model), which sees that disability exists only where 
social structures prevent a person from fully interacting. Thus, for example, 
as a person with a hearing loss, I do not have a disability when I am among a 
community of people who also speech read (and speak in "speech read"), be-
cause then I can understand and be understood perfectly. Likewise, the per-
son in a wheelchair does not have a disability if he is able to wheel himself 
into a building that is built with wheelchair access (with a ramp and wide 
doorways). In these instances, it is society itself that accommodates to dis-
ability without trying to "fIx" it but instead seeing it as a gift, whether that is 
society at large, or a simple, small society of speech-readers. 
This social model of disability has some parallel strands in theological 
discourse and feminist thought. In the 1970S, some feminists began to think 
in terms of "cultural feminism" or "gynocentric feminism:' Ruether names 
and describes this kind of feminism as "romantic" in excerpt 124 Romantic 
feminism will often name women as the peacekeepers, as gentle and nurtur-
ing caregivers, and therefore as having no disability. On this account, 
women bring unique gifts to humanity by their very woman-ness. Mary 
Aquin O'Neill writes of this form of feminism: 
There is a male way of being and a female way, and these can be known 
from an examination of the bodies of the two and given a fair degree of 
specifIcity. Thus men are supposed to be, by nature, active, rational, will-
ful, autonomous beings whose direction goes outward into the world; 
women are to be passive, intuitive, emotional, connected beings whose 
natural inclination is inward. (O'Neill 1993, 149) 
Many romantic feminists (Ruether discusses two types - conservative and 
reformist romantics) see these differences in men and women as simply part 
of their complementary nature. That is, humans share one nature, and men 
and women together demonstrate what that nature is. Men need women to 
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fill in gaps, and vice versa: men have roles and habits that are complementary 
to women's. We cannot be fully human without knowing ourselves in relatioll 
to members of the other gender, and so what it means to be fully human is to 
be in relationship with each other as men and women. Thus, men and women 
together comprise the many members of the one body of which Paul speaks. 
One problem that gynocentric feminism presents for thinking about 
disability is the "ethic of care" that it has developed. The "ethic of care" views 
women's unique gift to humanity as forming relationships with each other 
that emphaSize care of others. This is opposed to other ethical theories like 
those ofImmanuel Kant and John Rawls, which focus on rationality and jus-
tice, often from male perspectives that overlook women's ideas and work as 
valid. From the viewpoint of a theology of disability, however, there is a con-
cern with seeing women as the caregivers, particularly of people with di5-
abilities. For one thing, an ethic of care reinforces the idea that people witl1 
disabilities are different and therefore in need of more care than people 
without disabilities. Another argument against the ethic of care is that it may 
produce worry about whether a person can truly care for another or not. 
Jackie Leach Scully writes, "Parents might believe, rightly or wrongly, that 
they can better care for a child who is more rather than less like themselves: 
better able to anticipate their needs, to create strong emotional bonds, and to 
provide some appropriate guidance as they grow .. :' (Scully 2003, 277) · 
Likewise, Ruether does not see romantic feminism as the solution for 
understanding bodies. In excerpt 12.5, she makes the case that the best from 
liberal and romantic feminisms ought to be combined to create what she 
names "liberatory feminism:' Liberating women means making use of sym-
bols and tradition in new, freeing ways. Thus, Ruether examines the tradi-
tional Christian doctrine of Christ (excerpt 12.6) and answers definitivdy 
that a male savior can save women. (Some of Ruether's counterparts, like 
Mary Daly, will disagree.) As Ruether sees it, the traditional masculine sym-
bol of Christ becomes a powerful force for liberation because Jesus, far from 
upholding societal standards that approved of male superiority, always sup-
ported those with marginalized bodies, especially women. 
Multiplying Bodies 
Other feminists questioned this view of the "one body;' though, recognizing 
that for all that feminists might have achieved, there were some women who 
had not benefited from liberation. Liberal and gynocentric feminisms arose 
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from mainly white, educated women and tended to universalize "woman" to 
suggest that all women everywhere experienced what Ruether, as a white 
Christian woman, experienced. By the late 1970S and into the 1980s, women 
who did not share that background began to question the underlying as-
sumptions that white women made about other women, and the ways in 
which oppression took many forms. While white women might be op-
pressed, that did not mean they were not also guilty of oppressing others or 
overlooking significant concerns. 
The move toward understanding the feminist movement as a collection 
of many feminisms came in part out of the desire of women of other races, 
ethnicities, and classes to consider how gender politics worked. What it 
means to be a "body" began to have multiple answers for feminist scholars as 
well as theologians. Dualisms were no longer the problem. There was not 
woman versus man, but African-American woman in relation to African-
American man, African-American woman in relation to white man, Asian 
woman in relation to Asian man, and so on. 
Likewise, feminists concerned with disability took similar trajectories, 
realizing that theology cannot simply take white feminist strands and pull 
them in a thoroughgoing, uncritical way into thought about disability. For 
one thing, many of those associated with women's and gendered studies have 
a concerted focus on abortion that many disability activists find annihilat-
ing. As Nancy Eiesland recounts, 
Not long ago I gave a guest lecture in a feminist ethics course at a mainline 
seminary in the United States. The participants in the class were enthusi-
astic about understanding the social and ethical issues raised by women 
with disabilities until I noted that many people with disabilities were criti-
cal of the antidisability bias present in some feminist pro-choice argu-
ments. A student asked, "Wouldn't you agree that it is a woman's right to 
decide whether she wants to have a disabled child?" (quoted in Elshout 
1994, 114) 
Eiesland attempted to point out that that pattern of thought was one of the 
problems that those with disabilities have in modern culture. Eiesland's con-
versation not only highlights the points of departure between disability the-
ology and feminist theologies, but also raises up the inseparability of disabil-
ity theology and feminist thought. The idea that a woman has an inalienable 
right to choose for her own body comes crashing into the concern that such 
a focus stems from "able-ism:' Prevailing feminist thought presupposes that 
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the woman is able-bodied and wouldn't/couldn't/shouldn't care for a baby 
that would be disabled. 
For those with disabilities, the theological problem with feminists and 
abortion is not just that disabled fetuses are often the ones deemed necessary 
to be aborted, which is offensive to those with disabilities. It is also that the 
background of much feminist thought presumes a certain amount of choice 
with respect to bodies, and autonomy over those bodies. These are liber~l 
assumptions that stem from Enlightenment thought. African-America[J, 
women, too, have struggled with this issue. (See Dorothy Roberts' book ti.-
tIed Killing the Black Body.) 
Indeed, a conversation I once had with my ear doctor highlights the ten.-
sion. When I was pregnant, the doctor recommended genetic testing, and 
presumed that even though I have a hearing loss, I obviously wouldn't warlt 
to bring a baby into the world who has a hearing loss. From the doctor's 
point of view, this was my decision to make, since I am the one responsible 
for my child-bearing capacity. Yet this view is uniquely offensive, for it sug-
gests that what is worthwhile about my body is that it is rational, and th~t 
therefore as a rational creature I should recognize that disability is wrong-
headed. It also presumes that as a woman, I bear the sole responsibility for 
the marks of my own child-bearing body, without recognizing that what I do 
with my body does, in fact, affect others. If I "choose" to abort a baby with a 
hearing loss, what is that saying to other women, other people with disabili-
ties, about their own bodies? While seeming to support my autonomy, the 
doctor's statement also belies that our strongly anti-disabled culture controls 
people's views about who should and should not be born, and judges what 
"rational" people would and would not do. 
Excerpt 12.7, from Nancy Eiesland's groundbreaking work The Disabled 
God, makes a further point about disability and feminism. Eiesland begins by 
discussing what she calls "contextual Christology:' by which she means and 
presumes that God cares about people where they are, as they are. God does 
not love and care for a vague notion of universal humanity, but actually cares 
for each person as he/she is, and the way God does that is incarnationall}. 
God incarnate - God's becoming flesh and blood in Jesus Christ - would be 
maimed, bruised, and yes, disabled, on the cross, and so experienced and thus 
knows firsthand what it is like to be disabled. Indeed, salvation comes becaus~ 
of the disability, and for Eiesland this is liberatory. 
Eiesland recognizes feminist concerns here: that the same body that die. 
on the cross happens to be male, and so does not experience the bodilines. 
of being a woman. Eiesland agrees that women cannot support an image of 
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Christ that only undergirds white male privilege (that is, to see Christ as a 
White male is to privilege whiteness as the mode of Christ's salvation for hu-
manity). Nonetheless, she thinks that feminists run too far in directions 
which suggest that Christ was not human or that Christ was not divine. For 
Eiesland, the point instead is that Jesus Christ is a "survivor" and lived physi-
cally in this world. Rather than attempting to surpass or "erase" our 
bodiliness, Christ in his physicality "removes the barriers which constrain 
OUr bodies, keep us excluded, and intend to humiliate us" (12.7, 103). Indeed, 
in her excerpt Eiesland speaks strongly against those who advocate divine 
healing of people with disabilities, for that insinuates that Christ matters 
only in a spiritual way. Spiritual healing presumes that if one has enough 
faith, the body will be healed and surpassed. But Eiesland says no - God's 
love for us is deeper than wanting us to surpass our broken bodies. God 
loves us because of those broken bodies, and even becomes disabled in the 
Incarnation. Eiesland's excerpt closes with a commentary on all these prolif-
erating theologies - feminist, African-American, Latin American - that 
celebrates the diverse, many-membered Body of Christ in a Pentecostal 
(Acts 2) way. These new bodies of Christ simply represent "the corporate en-
actment of the resurrection of God" (12.7, 105). 
The Playful Body 
After the assertion ofEiesland and others that the many-membered Body of 
Christ is not a chaos after all, some scholars wondered whether bodies can 
have any meaning whatsoever. If the disabled God means something to me 
but not to you because you do not share my bodily experiences, then do we 
really have any shared understanding of what it is to say that we profess be-
lief in "one Lord Jesus Christ:' of whose body we are a part? 
Accordingly, some postmodern scholars have probed the "we" assump-
tions - that is, the idea that "we" have a shared view of the world. They say 
there is no longer any "grand narrative" (another way to understand "grand 
narrative" might be to see it as "cultural assumptions" about the way the 
world is) in which all people can participate, like the story that Christianity 
tells about what the world is. The world, on the Christian view, is fallen, in 
need of redemption, and that redemption comes in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Once, people held that narrative as true, but now, in our secular cul-
ture, we cannot assume that acquiescence to the story. In the absence of a 
grand narrative, how is a person to think about and understand the world? 
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The answers of some postmodern thinkers have related to the idea that 
the meaning of the world is constructed by societies or by power structures. 
What it means to be a woman in the United States is constructed by our 
sense of what a woman should look like, and we develop that sense through 
television, movies, what we read, what girls tell each other in the bathroom 
in junior high, what boys tell girls on dates, what magazines suggest about 
how to dress, wear makeup, and act, and on and on. However, if we were to 
be in another culture - say, the culture in Saudi Arabia - our understand-
ing of what it means to be a woman would be constructed in a very different 
way. Postmodern theorists take this idea still further, proclaiming that gen-
der is a fluid concept within a culture itself, that what it means to be a man or 
a woman is not definitively set by biological bodies. (See Judith Butler's book 
titled Bodies That Matter.) 
Sarah Coakley's essay comprises the final excerpts in this chapter and 
demonstrates one feminist theologian's use of this postmodern view of bod-
ies that is fluid and performative. In much of her work, Coakley uses sources 
such as Gregory of Nyssa to show how they offer a surprising account of 
gender and bodies, surprising because feminists like Ruether have tended to 
see these authors as patriarchal more often than not. For example, Gregory 
discusses virginity as a way to be "fecund;' but not in the sense that married 
men and women bear children. Ascetics give birth to spiritual children, even 
to the point of "giving birth to ourselves by our own free choice in accor-
dance with whatever we wish to be, whether male or female, molding our-
selves to the teaching of virtue or vice" (Coakley 2002, 164). 
In excerpt 12.8, Coakley takes on arguments against women's ordination 
(she herself is an ordained Anglican priest), namely those of Mary Douglas 
and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Douglas and Balthasar both maintain that ordi-
nation of women is problematic because of the gender binaries that God has 
put forth. Christ is the bridegroom of the church, the bride; the feminine 
qualities that women have are already superior to the masculine qualities 
that men have because women can be Marian in the sense of totally assent-
ing to God's will. Balthasar argues, "The Catholic Church is perhaps human-
ity's last bulwark of genuine appreciation of the difference of the sexes" 
(quoted in Sarah Coakley 2004, 85). 
Coakley thinks that Douglas and Balthasar have both hit on important 
points about what it means to be a woman or a man, but she also thinks that 
their arguments against ordination belie another, more interesting meaning· 
Balthasar sees, for example, that the male priesthood takes on both masCU-
line and feminine characteristics, though he is phYSiologically male. Coakley 
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finds this fascinating, for she agrees: a priest's role displays the fluidity of 
gender, but it causes her to ask why women, too, couldn't be part of this 
gender-bending, this playfulness with bodies. 
In the final excerpt (12.9), then, Coakley describes the motions of her 
body as she celebrates the Eucharist and finds that she herself experiences 
fluid gender play. She remains a woman, and yet she takes on both feminin-
ity and masculinity. On Coakley's view, this gender fluidity shows God's 
breaking into our world and transforming it, even while also keeping the 
world as it is. Such a claim is good news for us, with our limited human bod-
ies, because it gives us a way of understanding how our bodies might be lim-
ited and frustrating, but also capable of transcendence and transformation. 
Perhaps Coakley's view of bodies is the most empowering and realistic 
of the feminist theologies presented. Rather than seeing a body, with all its 
limits, weaknesses, and troubles, as something to be surpassed, or conversely 
as something to be wholeheartedly embraced, Coakley offers both. Could 
this be a way of recognizing that while humans cannot get outside of their 
bodies, there are still many ways in which bodies can be "played" beyond 
seeing a person with a disability as someone with a broken body that needs 
something done to it? 
Conclusion 
Women are disabled. I hope that by this point, my readers will see that mak-
ing this statement opens up a broad range of views about women, disability, 
and especially bodies, views that are both positive and negative. Yet the dan-
ger in this statement - and indeed in an essay of this kind - is to make it 
seem that all these differing points about feminist theologians have mostly 
to do with women and, as a sideline, with disabled people. 
Isn't this all academic nonsense if it doesn't say something helpful? 
Aren't these mere mind games for academics (ironically) if discussions 
about bodies don't lead to something concrete? The point of studying femi-
nist theology and bodies is to consider whether, from these particular points 
of view that don't arise from studying Karl Barth and the church fathers, 
Ruether, Eiesland, Coakley, and others are saying something truthful about 
human bodies. If we are reading them well, these theologians should cause 
us all to wonder and ask questions about our bodies - 'l\m I, too, a disabled 
body somehow?" - regardless of whether we fit into neat categories called 
"woman" or "disabled:' 
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A world that sees "normal" bodies as young, athletic, healthy, and male 
(Gr women's bodies as smooth, sleek, thin sex objects) - is not a world that 
understands itself as God does. "Normal" bodies require no help. Yet the 
prophets say that God views the world as fallen and in need of redemption. 
In that view, how can there truly be a "normal" body? Indeed, it could be 
said that Christianity makes all of our bodies abnormal. Jesus Christ's salva-
tion of us involves making us part of a new body that is strangely his (even 
his broken, bruised body on the cross), and yet comprised of all Christians 
- past, present, and future. 
The truthful speech that feminist theologians offer about bodies should 
push us all to consider ourselves as disabled in some way, needing to be re-
deemed by a Christ whose own body is broken. Bodily redemption is not 
perfection in the way that patriarchal culture has often defined it. 
The other lesson of feminist theologies and their wide-ranging discus-
sion of bodies should be to add humility into the equation. To say "I am dis-
abled" should not thereby lead to the mistaken notion that somehow I might 
now understand what it means to be blind or autistic. Rather, the very diver-
Sity of feminist theologies on the issue of bodies ought to spur us to under-
stand that we do not fully understand, nor are we done with the need for 
seeking understanding of others around us. 
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